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1.   Introduction 
 
In recent years, we can identify that South Korea’s long term economic 
interest is increasingly dependent on China with 2009 bilateral trade volumes 
increasing to 21.1% of total trade [source: IMF (DoTS)]. This rapid growth of 
bilateral trade has emerged by increased economic opportunity between the 
two countries, driven by the entry of China into the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in 2001. China’s entry into the WTO signified its acceptance of 
international rules of trade and enabled South Korea to invest1 in the Chinese 
economy [see Snyder and Byun (2010)]. A huge export market for South 
Korea developed. This strong international framework provided China and 
South Korea with a new mechanism for managing economic ambitions; the 
result being increased bilateral trade.  
 
Progress in the interest of security however, is much more aligned 
with North America as we observe that China continues to provide a lifeline 
to North Korea. Defence spending in South Korea is crucial to provide a 
regional balance of power and thus, it is in the national interest of North 
America to do so [for example see Scalapino (1991)]. North America has both 
strategic and financial interests in South Korea. In 2003 North America was 
South Korea’s second-largest supplier of foreign direct investment [see 
Manyin (2004)]. For several years, North America and South Korea have 
been discussing a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) and there have been 
numerous calls to implement a free trade agreement (FTA), reinforcing the 
increased cooperation between the two powers [see Manyin (2004)]. North 
America’s economic partnership with China is obvious, with a 2010 trade 
balance of US$ -273,065.5 million2 [source: US Census Bureau]. We begin to 
see a pattern; international economic and political cooperation is needed. In 
this interdependent world, North America, China and South Korea are 
operating in a strategic environment and their actions depend on the policies 
of others; trading has unavoidable game aspects [see Ozyildibim (1996)].  
 
This paper studies interactions between two nations, North America 
and China using an extensive form game where sequential rationality is 
assumed on the behaviour of each player [see Kreps and Wilson (1982)]. 
Despite its inescapabilty, few studies have attempted to formalize this line of 
argument. Krugman (1986) includes papers suggesting that there was a need 
for new thinking about trade policy, what it should target and the effects of 
such policies in an evolving international market. Brander (1986) considers 
strategic games played by national governments to welfare maximize and how 
                                                          
1
 In 1992 South Korea’s direct investment in China was US$19 million and grew to $2.721 
billion in 2002 – on average a 26.78 percent annual growth rate [see Zhan (2005)]. 
2
 Works by Feenstra et al. (1998) and Fung and Lau (1998) question the size and 
determinants of these bilateral trade volumes, however, this is something we do not consider 
in this paper. 
1
Thompson: Economic Shocks, Trade and International Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2011
policy initiatives affect the state of play for other governments. Literature on 
‘Trade Wars’ [for example see Conybeare (1987)] provided for interesting 
reading and lead me to consider the game aspects of international trade. 
Coneybeare (1987) provided me with an initiative to study the politics of an 
interdependent world where the actions of one agent affect the strategy of 
another.  
 
In Section 2 we formalize a game which is of complete but imperfect 
information, we call North America country 1 and China country 2. We call 
South Korea, who is an external non-actor, third country. I look for sequential 
equilibria and in Section 3 show the following result; for any q > 0.5, where q 
represents the state of country 1, which nature decides, country 1 plays U no 
matter what and country 2 plays A no matter what. This is the unique 
sequential equilibrium in game Γ. This shows that the optimal strategy for the 
two countries is to trade with each other, and a third country. We also show 
that a military alliance between country 1 and a third country is welfare 
increasing for all countries. 
 
The rest of this paper is set out as follows; in Section 4 we study an 
extension to game Γ by considering a change in international relations. A 
counter argument of that what is outlined above will be considered and will 
show the following result; for any value of q, where q represents the state of 
country 1, which nature decides, country 1 plays D no matter what and 
country 2 plays C no matter what. This is the unique sequential equilibrium in 
game Γ2. This shows that the optimal strategy for the two countries is to trade 
with each other as previously; but here country 1 not having a military 
alliance with a third country and country 2 not trading with a third country is 
welfare maximizing. The paper concludes in Section 5. 
 
 
2.   The Model 
Consider the following extensive form game Γ, shown in figure 1. In this 
game of complete but imperfect information there are two strategic players, 
country 1 (referred to in the Introduction as North America) and country 2 
(referred to in the Introduction as China). There is an external non-actor, who 
we call third country (referred to in the Introduction as South Korea).  
Nature sends a private signal selecting the state for country 1 which 
can be good or bad. Let {q, 1-q} denote a set of options about the state of the 
economy, where q stands for good state and 1-q stands for bad state. For the 
purpose of this paper we assume bad state is a recession. This information is 
not observed by country 2. 
2
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Let {U, D} be a set of strategies for country 1, independent of  its 
private type of information, where U stands for the action of ‘trading with 
country 2 and providing a military alliance to a third country’ and D stands 
for the action of ‘trading with country 2 and providing no military alliance to 
a third country’. Let {A, B, C, D} be a set of strategies for country 2, where A 
stands for the action ‘acceptance of the offer by country 1 and trading with a 
third country’, B stands for the action ‘rejection of the offer by country 1 and 
trading with a third country’, C stands for the action ‘acceptance of the offer 
by country 1 and no trading with a third country’ and D stands for the action 
‘rejection of the offer by country 1 and no trading with a third county’. We 
assume the level of trading between country 1 and a third country is external, 
remains constant and is positive throughout the game.  
The equilibrium concept I look for is sequential equilibrium. 
Sequential equilibrium [see Kreps and Wilson (1982)] is a solution concept 
based on the requirement of sequential rationality imposed on the behaviour 
of both countries. The strategic decisions of each country must be part of an 
optimal strategy. To examine optimality for country 2 we use Bayes' rule3 to 
attach probabilities to uncertain events at each information set of country 2. 
We call these beliefs δ, 1 – δ, γ, 1- γ. 
In game Γ, δ represents country 2’s belief that the state is good for 
country 1 upon observing U. 1 – δ represents country 2’s belief that the state 
is bad for country 1 upon observing U. γ represents country 2’s belief that the 
state is good for country 1 upon observing D. 1 – γ represents country 2’s 
belief that the state is bad for country 1 upon observing D. The equilibrium 
concept used in this model is based on beliefs formed by country 2 about 
which information set he4 is at given the action of country 1, and the beliefs 
about what will happen in the future given his action.  
Γ is played as follows; country 1 observes nature, which is either good 
or bad and at α, 1-α, β and 1-β, which are defined below, country 1 moves. 
Let us suggest that country 1 plays U; country 2 can play any strategy from 
set {A, B, C, D} which has to be optimal given his beliefs about the state, 
which is unknown to player 2. The same applies for when country 2 observes 
an offer of D by country 1. Hence we can say given δ, 1 – δ, γ or 1 – γ country 
2 will decide what to do. At this stage in the game, country 1 now knows what 
country 2’s beliefs are and will choose an action from set {α, β}. Once country 
1 does that, country 2 knows that country 1 knows what his beliefs are and 
therefore can compute back the actual value of α and β. This is how we find 
sequential equilibrium, which is dependent on payoffs.  
                                                          
3
  For theories of probability and its applications Bayes' rule shows the relationship between 
two conditional probabilities which are separate but dependable on each other [see Myerson 
(1991)]. 
4
 The use of gender is arbitrary. 
3
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In game Γ, α is the actual probability with which country 1 plays U 
when the state is good. 1 – α is the actual probability with which country 1 
plays D when the state is bad. β is the actual probability with which country 1 
plays U when the state is good.  1 – β is the actual probability with which 
country 1 plays D when the state is bad.  
The payoffs represent the motivations of the countries by ranking a set 
of outcomes. The payoffs for game Γ are shown in figure 1. Let us normalise 
the payoff of action {U, A} with state q to (8, 8); we suggest this because all 
countries are trading and the state is good for country 1. Let {U, D} be a set 
action with state q and let (4, 4) be the payoff; we suggest this because 
although the state is good, no countries are trading. Following from this we 
can say action {U, B} with state q can be assigned payoff (5, 7); reasoning for 
this reduction in utility for country 1 is because of the reduction in trade 
volumes. History shows bilateral trade between country 1 and country 2 is 
overwhelming, with a balance of US$ -273,065.5 million in 2010 [source: US 
Census Bureau], cutting this trade would be detrimental to country 1, shown 
by the reduced payoff. Utility of country 2 has also been reduced with this 
play. This can be explained by reduced export demand from country 1 but due 
to a surge in demand for Asian inter-regional trade [source: IMF], we suggest 
that utility has been reduced on a smaller scale. Action {U, C} with state q is 
assigned payoff (9, 6); reasoning for this increase in utility for country 1 is 
because of the termination of trade between country 1 and a third country. 
This termination of trade reduces the amount country 2 can extort from a third 
country, so tomorrow, we can say that country 2 is less powerful. Country 1 is 
trading and has a military alliance with a third country, country 2 is doing 
neither; this is explained by the payoffs. 
4
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Let {D, A} be a set action with state
increase in utility for country 2 can be explained by noting that county 1 is no 
longer providing a military alliance to a third country, so tomorrow we can 
say that country 1 is less powerful, shown by the decrease in utility. Let 
{D, B} be a set action with state 
this is that country 1 has no military alliance with a third country and is not 
engaging in trade with country 2 so utility is decreased. Utility here for 
country 2 is reduced for similar reasons to when action 
played; trade is terminated. Let 
(8, 6) be the payoff. We can say that the utility of 
to the normalised value of when act
although there is no military alliance with this play, country 2 is not trading 
with a third country and so the effect on utility is equal to zero. Not trading 
with a third country reduces the utility to 
{D, D} be a set action with state 
this decrease in utility for country 1 is because at this action, although in a 
good state it is not trading with country 2 and it has no military all
third country, so tomorrow, we can say that it is less powerful. Utility for 
country 2 is decreased because it is not trading with country 1, but utility is 
 q and let (7, 9) be the payoff; the 
q and let (4, 7) be the payoff; reasoning for 
{U, B} in state 
{D, C} be a set action with state 
8 here for country 2 is equal 
ion {U, A} is played in state 
6 for country 2 with this action. Let 
q and let (4, 5) be the payoff; reasoning for 
iance with a 
 
     
q is 
q and let     
q because 
5
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higher than at set action {U, D} at state q because we suggest that it is able to 
extort more from a third country because there is no military alliance between 
country 1 and a third country. 
Let {U, A} be a set action at state 1-q and let (5, 6) be the payoff; at 
this state country 1 is in a recession, so utility is decreased even though the 
trading position is the same as {U, A} at state q. There is no assumption that 
country 2 is in a bad state, but we can say utility is decreased as a result of the 
bad state in country 1. Let {U, B} be a set action at state 1 - q and let (3, 7) be 
the payoff; here we observe country 1 is in a worse position because of the 
bad state combined with a termination of trade with its biggest trading partner. 
Utility of country 2 is reduced from the normalised value of 8 because of the 
result of a bad state and the reduced trade, but here we can say that the 
decrease in utility is of a smaller scale. We assume country 2 is able to 
finance its own economy, because its citizens are increasingly able to 
consume in large enough quantities to stimulate economic growth internally 
[see Abeysinghe and Lu (2003)]. Let {U, C} be a set action at state 1 - q and 
let (5, 2) be the payoff; utility for country 1 has increased with this action 
because it is trading with country 2. Here, country 2 is not trading with a third 
country, suggesting it has reduced power in South-East Asia; this, combined 
with the military alliance between country 1 and a third country is reasoning 
for the larger decrease in utility for country 2. Let {U, D} be a set action at 
state 1 - q and let (4, 1) be the payoff; this represents the worst utility for 
country 2 because he is not trading with country 1 or a third country and 
country 1 has military alliance with a third country, so we can suggest that 
tomorrow, country 2 is less powerful. Utility for country 1 has decreased from 
action {U, C} at state 1 - q because there is no trade with country 2. 
Let {D, A} be a set action at state 1 - q and let (4, 6) be the payoff; 
reasoning for this is because country 1 is in a bad state and it has no military 
alliance with a third country. The payoff here is less than {U, A} at state q 
simply because we assume country 1 is worse off tomorrow from not having a 
military alliance with a third country. The same applies for all the payoffs for 
country 1 in game Γ. Let {D’, B} be a set action at state 1 - q and let (1, 7) be 
the payoff; this action represents the lowest utility for country 1 because it is 
in a bad state, it has no military alliance with a third country and is not trading 
with country 2; furthermore country 2 is trading with a third country, which 
we suggest reduces the power further for country 1. We again suggest that 
country 2 has higher utility due to financing its internal economy and due to 
increased inter-regional trade. Let {D, C} be a set action at state 1 - q and let 
(4, 3) be the payoff; an increased utility for country 1 from set {D, B} at state 
1 - q because of trading between country 1 and country 2; utility is still lower 
than the normalised payoff because of the state being bad and lack of military 
alliance with a third country. For country 2 utility has decreased on a greater 
scale because we suggest the reduced trade with a third country shows 
6
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reduced inter-regional trade. Let {D’, D} be a set action at state 1 - q and let   
(2, 4) be the payoff; here utility has increased for country 1 action {D, B} at 
state 1 - q because although all the actions from country 1 are the same, 
country 2 does have the increased hold on a third country because it is not 
trading. Finally, we can see at this state of play, country 1 is in a bad state and 
none of the countries are trading which we may suggests shows a decline in 
external economic relations for all countries. 
 
3.   Analysis 
We consider sequential equilibria. We will consider two cases separately: Can 
A be played no matter what is observed from set {U, D} constitute a 
sequential equilibrium? Can B be played no matter what is observed from set 
{U, D} constitute a sequential equilibrium? In the following theorem we show 
that for any q > 0.5 country 1 plays U no matter what and country 2 plays A 
no matter what; that is the unique sequential equilibrium in game Γ. 
The results of this model establish that country 1 and a third country 
trading and having a military alliance leads to efficient trading between 
country 1, country 2 and a third country. We suggest that this is a welfare 
maximizing strategy for South Korea because we can say that tomorrow due 
to the military alliance, China is less powerful and will therefore be able to 
extort less from South Korea. Corresponding literature on this centres around 
the work of Spero and Hart (2010) who conclude that the gap between 
international economics and politics is decreasing; when we consider trade, 
we need to consider the international political economy. We suggest that this 
equilibrium is welfare increasing for all countries. Chang-Hyung et al (2008) 
argue that China’s ambitions for a multilateral security framework would be 
welfare reducing for South Korea; from this we can conclude that North 
America and South Korea having a military alliance will suppress the power 
of China over South Korea, further supporting my results [for example see 
Synder and Byun (2010)].  
Trade between North America and China has obvious welfare gains 
for both nations. North America has been able to invest in the expanding 
Chinese economy and take advantage of low-cost labour for exported goods 
[see Elwell and Labonte (2007)]. North American consumers have 
experienced increased purchasing power due to cheap Chinese imports. 
Finally, interest rates have remained relatively low due to China purchasing 
North American Treasury bonds, funding the federal deficit, allowing for 
growth [see Morrison and Labonte (2009)].   
China joining the WTO has allowed bilateral trade between South 
Korea and China to increase by an average of 20 percent since 2001 [source: 
7
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KITA] due to increased political and economic security. Welfare gains of this 
increased cooperation are obvious. Direct investment of some 41,000 firms 
[source: KITA] from South Korea to China, including major corporate groups 
such as Samsung and LG have allowed South Korea to cultivate new 
industries and experience rapid growth.5 I now formalize these results. 
 
Theorem 1   For any q > 0.5 country 1 plays U no matter what and country 
2 plays A no matter what. Together these form the only sequential equilibrium 
in game Γ. 
 
Before we prove this theorem, we make the following observations 
natural for any sequential equilibrium.6 In this model, at each information set, 
country 2 must form a belief about the state of country 1, denoted by set      
{q, 1 - q}. For game Γ, a belief is in the form of a probability distribution over 
the nodes in the information set. Given country 2’s beliefs, his strategy must 
be sequentially rational. That is, no matter what country 2 observes from set 
{U, D}, his action must be optimal given his beliefs about whether nature has 
selected good or bad for country 1 and his subsequent strategies. Given the 
action of country 2, the strategy of country 1 must be sequentially rational. 
That is, no matter what country 1 observes from set {A, B, C, D}, his action 
must be optimal. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1   Upon observing U, with beliefs δ and 1 - δ, country 2’s 
payoffs are as follows, given by utilities: 
 (A | ,    . 8 
 1  6   . 2 
 6          (1) 
 (B | ,    . 7 
 1  7   . 7 
 7  7                            (2) 
 (C | ,    . 6 
 1  2   . 4 
 2                 (3) 
 (D | ,    . 4 
 1  1   . 3 
 1       (4) 
From this we can deduce that C and D will never be an optimal 
strategy for country 2 since any option from set {A, B} will generate higher 
levels of utility for any value of δ. This leaves two key findings regarding 
optimality for player 2 upon observing U. A is an optimal strategy                  
iff . 2 
 6 > 7 and hence for when δ > ½. Furthermore, B is an optimal 
                                                          
5
 2010 average GDP growth was 6.1 percent [source: CIA (2011)]. 
6
 Gibbons (1992) gives an informal description of these observations. Kreps and Wilson 
(1982) formalises these. 
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strategy iff 7 > . 2 
 6 and hence for when δ < ½.  So when δ = 1/2, either A 
or B can be played. Note here that inequalities are sufficient because we are 
dealing with optimality.  
Upon observing D, with beliefs γ and 1-γ, country 2’s payoffs are as 
follows, given by utilities:  
       (A | ,    . 9 
 1  6   . 3 
 6                    (5) 
       (B | ,    . 7 
 1  7   7                                         (6)     
       (C | ,    . 6 
 1  3   . 3 
 3                                   (7) 
       (D | ,    . 5 
 1  4    
 4                                  (8) 
From this we can deduce that C and D will never be an optimal 
strategy for country 2 since any option from set {A, B} will generate higher 
levels of utility for any value of γ. This leaves two key findings regarding 
optimality for player 2 upon observing D. A is optimal iff γ. 3 
 6 > 7 and 
hence for when γ > 1/3. Furthermore, B is an optimal strategy iff 7 > . 3 
 6 
and hence for when γ < 1/3. So when γ = 1/3 either A or B can be played. 
Consider country 2 playing A with probability 1 when nature has 
selected that the state is good for country 1. Following our observations 
country 1 will always play U and subsequently α = 1. Using Bayes’ rule to 
attach a probability to this uncertain event at this information set of country 2, 
given by, 
   ..                                           (9) 
we get δ = q. To be consistent with player 2’s beliefs δ > ½ and this is 
true iff q > ½. When nature has selected the state is bad for country 1, country 
1 will always play U then β = 1. Using Bayes’ rule to attach a probability to 
this uncertain event at this information set of country 2, given by, 
1     1   ..                        (10)      
  we get 1 – δ = 1 – q and so δ = q. Therefore, for any q > 0.5 country 1 
plays U no matter what and player 2 plays A no matter what; together these 
form a sequential equilibrium in game Γ. 
We now show that the observations we made earlier suffice to 
eliminate our second case and allow us to rule out any other implausible 
equilibrium. Upon observing U, with beliefs δ and 1 - δ, country 2’s utilities 
are the same as previously. Here, however, we are considering that B is the 
optimal strategy. We say B is optimal iff 7 > δ.2 + 6 and hence for when         
δ < ½ and iff 7 > . 3 
 6 for when γ < 1/3. So consider country 2 playing B 
9
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with probability 1 when nature has selected the state is good for country 1. 
Following our observations country 1 will always play U and subsequently    
α = 1. We see again from Bayes’ rule that δ = q but for B to be optimal if 
country 1 plays U,  δ < ½ which is only true iff q < ½ but when nature selects 
the state is good for country 1 q > ½. This is not consistent with the beliefs of 
country 2 and hence there is no sequential equilibrium to support action B 
upon observing U at state q. The same is true for when nature selects the state 
is bad for country 1.  QED 
Theorem 1 shows that there is no other sequential equilibrium in game 
Γ. We now study a variant of this game and make suggestions about how a 
change in international relations affects equilibrium. 
 
4.   International Relations Revisited 
We now study a variation of game Γ, we call it game Γ2. This is shown in 
figure 2. The methodology is the same as in my initial model, although the 
payoffs differ. The motivations behind these new payoffs are shown in 
Section 4.1. We study this game to consider a counter argument to the one 
expressed in Γ and suggest that country 1 will get the highest utility when 
trading with country 2 and when not providing a military alliance with a third 
country, independent of state. Reasoning for this is because here we suggest 
that it is not efficient for North America to provide a military alliance as we 
assume that South Korea can be self-sufficient militarily against the North 
[see Niksch (2005)]. History supports this idea; in 2008 the number of North 
American troops in South Korea reduced to 28,500 [source: U.S. Department 
of State]. Plans by North America and South Korea to reduce the military 
alliance between the two nations came with an agreement to transfer wartime 
operational control to South Korea on April 17, 2012 [source: U.S. 
Department of State]. Further to this, South Korea’s defence budget rose from 
2.8% of GDP in 2007 to 3.2% in 2008 [source: Council of Foreign Relations] 
suggesting that it would be economically inefficient for North America to 
continue to provide this one-sided military alliance to South Korea. We 
suggest that a military alliance damages the internal economic and political 
situation within North America due to increased hardship faced by North 
American soldiers in South Korea [for example see Bleiker (2003)]. 
We show that the optimal strategy for country 2 would be to trade with 
country 1 and  to not trade with a third country because, although country 2 is 
a member of the WTO, there is no similar regional framework for facilitating 
political and economic issues between the two nations [see Snyder and Byun 
(2010)]. South Korea is not part of the China-ASEAN free trade agreement 
(ACFTA), a new diplomatic strategy of China which seeks to “capitalize on 
globalisation to accelerate China’s economic development and elevate 
10
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China’s power” [see Wang (2007) p.2]. South Korea not being a part of this 
leads us to suggest that China’s welfare is higher when dealing with countries 
inside ACFTA; reasoning for this is because of the geopolitical and geo-
economic objectives7 of the FTA [see Wang (2007)]. 
To assess welfare implications for a third country, we look at the 
sequential equilibrium positions in game Γ and game Γ2 and use economic 
logic to assess the impact of such equilibria on South Korea. In this game, we 
suggest that South Korea in the long run will experience a welfare gain from 
not having a military alliance with North America, because it will be able to 
continue to build on an alliance with China, its regional partner. This will lead 
to China trading with South Korea, like in game Γ and South Korea will 
experience welfare gains from the net benefits this will create, both politically 
and economically. However, given the relations with North, the future of 
South Korea is uncertain. 
We normalise the payoff of action {U, B} regardless of state to (0, 0). 
This is because in this game, with a change in international relations we 
suggest that country 1 having a military alliance with a third country reduces 
utility because it is economically inefficient and causes economic and 
political unrest8; it is also not trading with country 2, its largest trading 
partner. For country 2, utility is also zero because we suggest that he gets a 
higher utility when he does not trade with a third country because of the 
absence of a regional trade agreement; with this action country 2 is not trading 
with country 1, further reducing utility. 
                                                          
7
 Wang (2005) p.2 describes these as “cultivating good will among neighbours, maintaining 
regional stability and securing key markets and raw materials needed for China’s economic 
growth.” 
8
 More detailed explanations for the motivations behind these new payoffs, with 
corresponding literature have been outlined in Section 4. 
11
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 Let {U, A} be a set action with state q and let (1, 2) be the payoff; 
reasoning for this is because although both country 1 and country 2 are 
trading, country 1 has a military alliance with a third country and country 2 is 
trading with a third country, both of which are undesirable. The expected 
utility of country 1 is lower than that of country 2 because at state q we 
assume that country 1 having the military alliance with a third country is a 
waste of resources and could cause a further reduction in future utility.9 Let 
{U, C} be a set action at state q and let (3, 4) be the payoff; this is the highest 
utility for both players when strategy U is played at state q. Reasoning for this 
is because both countries are trading with each other and country 2 is not 
trading with a third country, given our assumptions about the economic 
climate in this game, this is the action which generates the highest utility for 
country 2. The utility of country 1 is lower than that of country 2 because it is 
still has a military alliance with a third country, which we assume to be 
undesirable. Let {U, D} be a set action at state q and let (0, 1) be the payoff; 
utility has decreased here to the normalised value for country 1 because it is 
not trading with its largest trading partner and it is providing an inefficient 
military alliance to a third country. Reasoning for the utility of country 2 
being higher than that of country 1 is the same as action {U, A} at state q.  
                                                          
9
 This assumption is made because we have established that South Korea is increasing its 
military spending as a percentage of GDP [source: Council of Foreign Relations] so North 
America supporting South Korea militarily is inefficient. 
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Let {D, A} be a set action at state q and let (3, 2) be the payoff; 
reasoning for this is because both countries are trading and country 1 is not 
providing a military alliance to a third country. The payoff is lower for 
country 2 because he is trading with an external non-actor. Let {D, B} be a set 
action at state q and let (1, 0) be the payoff; reasoning for this is the same as 
set action {U, B} at state q apart from the utility of country 1 is higher because 
he is not providing a military alliance to a third country. Let {D, C} be a set 
action at state q and let (5, 5) be the payoff; this action generates the highest 
level of utility for both players in game Γ2 because both countries are trading, 
country 1 does not have a military alliance with a third country nor is country 
2 trading with a third country. Let {D, D} be a set action at state q and let     
(2, 1) be the payoff; reasoning for this lower utility of country 2 is because at 
this action he is trading with a third country, which we suggest would be less 
efficient that country 2 trading with a member of ACFTA. Utility of country 1 
has decreased at a lower rate because even though it is not trading with its 
largest trading partner, he gets utility from not having a military alliance with 
a third country.  
Let {U, A} be a set action at state 1 - q and let (1, 1) be the payoff; at 
this state country 1 is in a recession, so utility is decreased even though the 
trading position is the same as {U, A} at state q. There is no assumption that 
country 2 is in a bad state, but we can say utility is decreased as a result of the 
bad state in country 1. With this action both countries are acting in ways 
which, with this economic climate they consider undesirable. Let {U, B} be a 
set action at state 1 - q and let (0, 0) be the payoff; reasoning for this is the 
same as action {U, B} at state q. Let {U, C} be a set action at state 1 - q and let 
(2, 2) be the payoff; reasoning for this is because country 2 is acting optimally 
given our assumptions about international relations but because of country 1 
being in a bad state, utility is lower for both countries than the same action at 
state q. Let {U, D} be a set action at state 1 - q and let (0, 1) be the payoff; 
reasoning for this is the same as action {U, D} at state q. We can say here that 
the state of country 1 does not effect this set action.  
Let {D, A} be a set action at state 1 - q and let (2, 1) be the payoff; 
reasoning for this is because country 1, even though in a bad state, is acting 
optimally given our assumptions about international relations. Utility is lower 
for country 2 because it is not acting optimally given our assumptions; utility 
for both countries is lower than that of the same action at state q because of 
the effects of the recession affecting both countries. Let {D, B} be a set action 
at state 1 - q and let (1, 0) be the payoff; reasoning for this is the same as set 
action {D, B} at state q. We can say here that the state of country 1 does not 
effect this set action. Let {D, C} be a set action at state 1 - q and let (3, 3) be 
the payoff; reasoning for this is the same as set action {D, B} at state q but 
here the state of the country 1 decreases the utilities for both countries 
because they are both trading with each other so there is a knock-on effect of 
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the bad state in country 1 on country 2. Finally, let {D, D} be a set action at 
state 1 - q and let (1, 1) be the payoff; reasoning for this is because although 
both countries are acting optimally given our assumptions about international 
relations, they are doing so when country 1 is in a bad state and therefore 
utility is reduced. 
 
4.2   Analysis 
Let us look at sequential equilibrium. We consider the case: Can C be played  
no matter what is observed from set {U, D} constitute a sequential 
equilibrium? In the following theorem we show that in game Γ2 for any value 
of q country 1 plays D no matter what and country 2 plays C no matter what; 
that is the unique sequential equilibrium. 
The results of this extension show, due to a suggested change in 
international relations that country 1 trading with country 2 is optimal, but 
only when country 2 is not trading with a third country and country 1 does not 
have a military alliance with a third country. Reasoning for this is because of 
the lack of a regional framework between China and South Korea for 
managing the political economy aspects of trade [see Snyder and Byun 
(2010)]. We suggest that this may lead to inefficiencies due to trade wars; The 
Garlic War, The Kimchi War and The Melamine Scandal are some 
examples.10 Without the membership of South Korea in ACFTA, one can say 
that there isn’t willingness for both nations to develop stronger mechanisms 
for managing trade, and we may suggest that trade is inefficient and not an 
optimal strategy.  
The optimal strategy for North America is to trade with China and to 
not provide a military alliance to South Korea. Reasoning for this trade with 
China is the same as in game Γ, however, now we suggest that the added 
military alliance between North America and South Korea is inefficient. We 
say this because we assume that South Korea can be militarily self sufficient 
against the North [see Niksch (2005)].  
 
Theorem 2    For any value of q, country 1 plays D no matter what and 
country 2 plays C no matter what. Together these form the only sequential 
equilibrium in game Γ2.  
 
                                                          
10
 Snyder and Byun (2010) evaluate these in some detail.  
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Proof.   To establish this theorem we make the same observations as in 
game Γ. Upon observing U, with beliefs δ and 1 - δ, country 2’s payoffs are as 
follows, given by utilities: 
      (A | ,    . 2 
 1  1    
 1                         (11) 
      (B | ,    . 0 
 1  0  0                         (12) 
      (C | ,    . 4 
 1  2   2.  
 2                     (13) 
      (D | ,    . 1 
 1  1  1                          (14) 
For C to be optimal 2.δ + 2 > δ + 1; 2.δ + 2 > 0 and 2.δ + 2 > 1; this 
will always hold. From this we can deduce that any from set {A, B, D} will 
never be an optimal strategy for country 2 since strategy C will always be 
optimal given any value of δ. 
Upon observing D, with beliefs γ and 1-γ, country 2’s payoffs are as 
follows, given by utilities:  
   (A | ,    . 2 
 1  1    
 1                        (15) 
   (B | ,    . 0 
 1  0   0                                                         (16) 
   (C | ,    . 5 
 1  3  2.  
 3                       (17) 
   (D | ,    . 1 
 1  1   1                                     (18) 
For C to be optimal 2.  
 3 !   
 1;  2.  
 3 ! 0 and 2.  
 3 >1; 
this will always hold. From this we can deduce that any from set {A, B, D} 
will never be an optimal strategy for country 2 since strategy C will always be 
optimal given any value of γ.  
Consider country 2 playing C with probability 1 when nature has 
selected that the state is good for country 1. Following our observations 
country 1 will always play D and subsequently α = 0. Using Bayes’ rule, 
                                               19 
we get γ = q. This is consistent with country 2’s beliefs for any value 
of γ. When nature has selected the state is bad for country 1 he will always 
play D and then β = 0. Using Bayes’ rule, 
1                                           (20) 
we get 1 – γ = 1 – q and so γ = q. This is consistent with country 2’s 
beliefs for any value of γ. Therefore, we can say for any value of q country 1 
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plays D no matter what and country 2 plays C no matter what together form 
the only sequential equilibrium in game Γ2.  [QED] 
 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have considered a strategic analysis of trade and focused on 
sequential equilibrium [see Kreps and Wilson (1982)] by constructing a game 
of complete but imperfect information to analyse trade patterns between two 
countries and a third country, who is an external non-actor. I also consider 
what impact a military alliance between country 1 and this third country has 
on equilibrium. I have shown that for country 2, any option from set {C, D} 
will never be optimal and so the strategy disappears in game Γ. It follows 
from theorem 1 that for any q > 0.5 country 1 plays U no matter what and 
player 2 plays A no matter what together form the only sequential equilibrium 
in game Γ.  
From what I have established in this paper, I can conclude that country 
1 and a third country having a military alliance leads to efficient trade 
relations between country 1, country 2 and a third country. This is proved 
formally in game Γ. Reasoning for this is because we can say that country 1 
having a military alliance with a third country reduces the amount that 
country 2 can extort from this third country and tomorrow, it is less powerful. 
Although the third country is external, we may suggest that it will experience 
the largest gains in welfare by having a military alliance with country 1 and 
trading with both countries; effectively having balanced relations between the 
two countries. 
I consider an extension to this model by studying a change in 
international relations. It follows from theorem 2 that for any value of q 
country 1 plays D no matter what and country 2 plays C no matter together 
form the only sequential equilibrium in game Γ2.  
An extension of this model in the direction of analysing the 
differences in sequential equilibrium for when the military alliance between 
country 1 and an external third country is secretive would be desirable. 
However, the aim of this study is to introduce sequential equilibrium when a 
military alliance is observed rather than country 2 having to form a belief 
about this. Nevertheless, if the payoffs are known, the adjustments to this 
model would be straightforward. 
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